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I. INTRODUCTION  
Housing philosophy and policy must be rewritten to ensure it is equitable 
and promotes high morale, readiness, esprit-de-corps and a sense of 
personal responsibility and community support. 
—Defense Science Board Task Force on Quality of Life 
For many years, the U.S. military has struggled with ensuring that its service 
members and their families were provided with adequate military housing. The quantity 
of available military housing has been restricted by competing budget priorities, and the 
quality of military housing has often lagged the continuous improvement of private-
sector housing standards and amenities. This struggle has led to the slow deterioration of 
the military’s housing stock, with nearly 180,000 inadequate housing units by the mid-
1990s. As a result, the Department of Defense (DoD) presented Congress with a plan to 
implement a new, revolutionary approach to solve the housing crisis by allowing the 
service departments to partner with private organizations to undertake the revitalization 
of military housing. By using the private sector’s expertise and resources, the DoD has 
been able to eliminate nearly all inadequate housing and successfully privatize family 
housing projects across the country (U.S. Senate Committee 2012; DoD 2010b).   
A. RESEARCH OBJECTIVES 
Privatization experiments have been attempted in the past but did not achieve the 
same level of success as the current Military Housing Privation Initiative (MHPI) has 
proven (U.S. Senate Committee 2012). The objective of this report is to identify how the 
DoD has applied the lessons of early privatization efforts to manage risks and to 
guarantee success of the current MHPI. 
B. SCOPE AND LIMITATIONS 
To identify how the DoD has applied the lessons of early privatization efforts, this 
project highlights key lessons learned and provides a holistic perspective to the evolution 
of the privatization of military housing. The project’s primary focus is on domestic 
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military family housing following the end of World War II. Though the DoD has 
addressed housing for unaccompanied service members in parallel with efforts to 
privatize family housing, inclusion of unaccompanied housing in this report would 
hamper analysis due to the inherent differences of these two types of housing benefits and 
clientele. In the same regard, this report does not identify or elaborate on specific 
attributes within each service’s acquisition process or execution of housing master plans 
unless where required to support the project’s objectives. 
C. METHODOLOGY AND ORGANIZATION OF STUDY 
Reviews of government reports, surveys, presentations, journal articles, and 
Congressional testimony were used to trace the progression of the privatization programs. 
Portions of these documents are included in the tables and figures of this report. 
Chapter II provides a background of previous privatization experiments and 
addresses key issues that led to their demise. 
Chapter III shifts to describing the current MHPI process and then explores the 
significant challenges in achieving the elimination of inadequate housing through 
privatization. The current state of the MHPI is summarized at the end of the chapter. 
Chapter IV presents analysis on the issues identified in early privatization 
programs and on how these issues were mitigated in the MHPI. 
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II. LITERATURE REVIEW 
Our installations are the home of U.S. combat power—and our 
installation assets are an inseparable element of the nation’s military 
readiness and wartime effectiveness. 
—2007 Defense Installations Strategic Plan 
A. INTRODUCTION 
This chapter provides a summary of research conducted on early efforts to 
privatize military housing following the period after World War II. This literature review 
provides a perspective on the lessons learned from past privatization attempts, and the 
political and economic challenges surrounding the DoD’s efforts to leverage the private 
industry resources to provide military family housing in the most efficient and 
economical means.  
As a historian for the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers Office of History, Dr. 
Baldwin researched and produced the essay, “Four Housing Privatization Programs: A 
History of the Wherry, Capehart, Section 801 and Section 802 Family Housing Programs 
in the Army,” tracing the creation of four military housing privatization programs 
employed in the twentieth century. His work supported efforts by the U.S. Army 
Engineer Strategic Studies Center to present research on the future of military housing for 
the U.S. Army Chief of Staff (Baldwin 1996). Baldwin documented these early 
privatization experiments and lessons learned from the end of World War II to the 
beginning of modern day privatization efforts. 
B. FOUR HOUSING PROGRAMS 
The narrative of military family housing begins in the period following the end of 
the Second World War. Rising tensions between the United States and the Soviet Union 
required that the U.S. maintain a large peacetime standing army. Though the onset of the 
Cold War posed many challenges for the armed forces, housing the largest peacetime 
army with only a small stock of existing family housing quickly became a challenge 
(Baldwin 1996). 
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In the 1940s, before and after the war, permanent construction of new units and 
maintenance on existing structures had been a low priority. Unfortunately, many service 
members accepted living in substandard living conditions due to the inadequate housing 
supply at some bases (Figure 1). 
 
 
Figure 1.   Substandard Living Conditions at Fort Dix, New Jersey, in 1949 (From Life 
Magazine, March 7, 1949, p. 34) 
In 1948, the Secretary of the Army urged base commanders to meet with local 
businessmen and persuade them to build housing near installations for military families to 
immediately address this housing problem. These businessmen were reluctant to partner 
with military commanders to build housing for many reasons (Baldwin 1996). Baldwin 
notes that the main concern of private investors was that the venture was too risky. For 
the private investor, the success of the project directly hinged on the number of personnel 
assigned to an installation, which could fluctuate during the term of the project as 
military commanders reassigned personnel. Furthermore, investors/developers were 
entirely dependent on the base staying open during a period of post-war base shutdowns. 
If a base were to shut down, developers feared that they would be left holding vacant 
properties (Baldwin 1996). While base commanders attempted to work out these 
challenges at the local level, Congress took action to solve the military housing shortage.   
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C. THE WHERRY PLAN 
In 1949, Senator Kenneth S. Wherry from Nebraska introduced a bill that 
provided a solution for the Army’s housing shortage. This bill was modeled after the 
Section 608 programs of the Depression-era Housing Act of 1934, which later provided 
insurance for housing war workers and veterans returning from war. Senator Wherry’s 
bill allowed developers, termed sponsors, to bid on housing projects deemed necessary by 
the Secretary of Defense. The service would then charge the developers with the 
construction, operations, and maintenance of the housing. These projects were built on 
either private property near installations or inside the installation on land leased from the 
DoD. The Secretary of Defense was responsible for certifying that an installation’s 
housing needs were justified and that the service had no intentions of closing the base or 
curtailing its activities (Baldwin 1996). 
Senator Wherry’s bill was enacted in late 1949, the same year it was introduced. 
The secretary of defense and the FHA commissioner were authorized to approve 
mortgages at an average $8,100 per unit with a maximum of $9,000 for single-family 
detached units for higher-ranking personnel. Unfortunately, at these prices, rental rates 
were too expensive and exceeded the Basic Allowance for Quarters (BAQ)1 of junior 
personnel; however, legislators agreed that senior personnel should be steered toward 
Wherry housing, leaving traditional government quarters to be assigned to lower-ranking 
personnel. Additionally, Congress had set the maximum mortgage interest rate at 
4 percent and maximum mortgage amount to 90 percent of replacement cost. With the 
mortgage amount being short of the full cost for developing a project, developers would 
have some incentive to efficiently and economically operate the housing (Baldwin 1996). 
1. Wherry Plan Overview and Procedures 
According to Baldwin (1996), the Federal Housing Administration (FHA) played 
a key role in privatized military housing under the Wherry plan. First, the FHA provided 
mortgage insurance to private sponsors in order for them to more easily obtain a loan 
from a private lender. This insurance was funded from the newly established Military 
                                                 
1 BAQ is a housing allowance similar to the current Basic Allowance for Housing (BAH). 
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Housing Insurance Fund supported by insurance premiums paid by the private sponsors. 
After obtaining mortgage insurance from the FHA, the developer could then solicit a loan 
from a private lender. The developer would then enter contract to build, operate, and 
maintain the specified number and type of housing units for the service department. Also, 
the FHA established rental schedules for the Wherry units that allowed sponsors to make 
a profit and pay for the cost for operations, maintenance, and debt amortization. The FHA 
also set standards for housing design, construction, and habitability (Baldwin 1996). 
Wherry housing was considered rental housing instead of government quarters 
since the homes were privately owned. Sponsors were authorized to rent housing to 
civilians but only after giving priority to service members. Military members who chose 
to rent could do so using their BAQ (Baldwin 1996). 
2. Wherry Plan Obstacles 
Baldwin (1996) describes how problems were quickly encountered as the program 
was implemented and the services began to propose new housing projects.   
As proposals were submitted and then rejected by the FHA, sponsors started to 
complain about the process and associated delays. The FHA rejected many of the 
service’s project proposals because the schedules of rent were too low and designs failed 
to meet FHA standards (Baldwin 1996). The Secretary of Defense temporarily suspended 
the program and appointed an investigating commission to review delays in the program 
and the sponsor selection processes (Peeler et al. 2007, chap. 4, 72–73).  
a. Wherry Program Comes Under Investigation 
The Department of Defense Housing Commission was charged with 
conducting this investigation. In addition to the issues with the rejected proposals, the 
commission found that prospective developers were placing bids equal to the amount of 
mortgage that they could obtain instead of a bid that included the equity they would place 
in the project. Under the original Wherry program bill, sponsors were limited to only 
obtaining a mortgage at 90 percent of the cost of the project and had to provide the 
remaining 10 percent from other funds. The commission discovered that a developer 
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potentially could have built a project solely with the mortgage and could have foregone 
investing any equity in the project (Baldwin 1996). Baldwin (1996) terms this practice of 
funding 100 percent of the project with the mortgage as “mortgaging out.” 
Additionally, the commission determined that delays in the program were 
due to “cumbersome” procedures related to selection of sponsors and staffing of military 
field offices (Peeler et al. 2007, chap. 4, 72).   
b. Actions Following the Investigation 
In May of 1950, Congress passed legislation to cure some of the problems 
of the program. To address the problem with project designs not meeting FHA 
requirements, Congress authorized the services to hire architect-engineer firms to draw 
up plans and specifications upon which developers would bid vice having the developer 
present their own design plans which as previously noted, might not meet FHA 
requirements. To offset the service’s cost for hiring these design firms, the winning 
bidder would reimburse the government for the design fees (Baldwin 1996). 
Although the outcome of the investigation did not lead to resolving any of 
the issues with mortgaging out, the DoD streamlined some of the program’s processes by 
revising the sponsor selection procedures and defining areas of responsibility between all 
stakeholders: the service secretaries, the FHA, architecture and engineering firms, and 
sponsors (Peeler et al. 2007, chap. 4, 73).  
c. Accusations of Windfall Profits 
According to Baldwin (1996), the issue with sponsors mortgaging out, 
building their projects for less than the FHA authorized amount, did not sit well with 
many members of Congress. Congress enacted an “anti-windfall profits” amendment to 
Title VIII of the National Housing Act in 1953. The amendment required private 
sponsors to certify that the actual cost of their projects equaled or exceeded the FHA-
insured mortgage amount. This cost certification process also had the sponsors repay the 
difference, or “windfall profits,” to their lenders. Though these provisions were 
unpopular with builders, it did not stop the practice of mortgaging out since it did not 
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enforce the 10 percent equity requirement. This amendment only required that the 
sponsor certify, at a minimum, that the total cost of the project equaled the mortgage 
amount, potentially sanctioning the practice of mortgaging out since the mortgage only 
represented 90 percent of the total cost of the project (Baldwin 1996). 
In the spring of 1954, Congress enacted a tougher cost certification 
provision that would end the practice of mortgaging out. Under this new law, builders 
had to certify that the mortgage was no more than 90 percent of the actual cost of the 
projects. This provision enforced the requirement for the sponsors to bring 10 percent 
equity to the project as originally intended (Baldwin 1996). Baldwin (1996) notes that 
this more stringent anti-windfall profit provision caused many builders to become 
disinterested and that this change essentially killed the Wherry program. Only a handful 
of new Wherry projects started after August 1954 (Baldwin 1996). 
D. THE CAPEHART PROGRAM 
As construction firms lost interest in the Wherry program, Congress reconsidered 
how to address the housing problem in the armed forces. Though the Wherry program 
quickly relieved housing needs, the increased military activity during the Korean War, in 
combination with the deterioration of World War II temporary housing, created an 
overall increase in the services’ demand for housing. A new program sponsored by 
Indiana Senator Homer E. Capehart attempted to correct the short falls of the Wherry 
program and renew the interest in utilizing private investment to quickly and 
economically rectify the military housing shortage (Peeler et al. 2007, chap. 4, 83). 
1. Capehart Program Overview and Procedures 
Baldwin (1996) states that the major differences between the Capehart and the 
Wherry programs were that the maximum unit cost increased from $9,000 to $13,500, 
and that private sponsors would only build and not operate family housing units. 
Capehart housing was only built on government land vice a mix of government lands and 
privately leased property as with the Wherry program (Peeler et al. 2007, chap. 4, 83). To 
address the problems of windfall profits as noted during the Department of Defense 
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Housing Commission’s investigation in 1950, the Capehart legislation was subject to the 
Renegotiation Act of 1951. This act allowed the government to recover excess profits 
from private benefactors (Baldwin 1996). 
The role of the FHA in the Capehart program was to provide mortgage insurance 
to private sponsors and estimate replacement cost of projects as in the Wherry program. 
The FHA was authorized to require the DoD to guarantee the mortgage insurance fund 
against loss if the agency disagreed with the Secretary of Defense’s determination of the 
need to build housing. This requirement provided incentive for the DoD to be judicious in 
adhering to FHA recommendations (Baldwin 1996). 
Upon winning a bid, the sponsor formed a new company for each project, and 
then obtained mortgage insurance (for 100 percent of the bid) from the FHA and a 
mortgage from a private lender (for 25-years at a rate limited to 4 percent at average cost 
of $13,500 per unit). The corporation would then reimburse the service for the design 
cost. At the completion of construction, the corporation was turned over to the service 
(Baldwin 1996). 
The Secretary of Defense certified the need for housing at an installation to 
initiate the project (Baldwin 1996). The service departments hired architect-engineering 
firms to design projects put up for bid. Once a project was completed and turned over 
with the mortgage to the service, the mortgage would be paid down with service 
members’ BAQ, and the project would be operated and maintained with appropriated 
funds (Baldwin 1996). 
2. Capehart Plan Obstacles 
Like the Wherry program, the Capehart program had problems early in its 
implementation.   
a. Sponsors Bids Exceed FHA Estimates 
Baldwin (1996) discusses that many project bids exceeded the 
independently developed FHA replacement cost estimates. Like the Wherry program, the 
FHA would provide mortgage insurance funded by the program’s participants. In a few 
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cases, the FHA’s replacement cost estimates were below all the bids on a project. For one 
project, the FHA was able to revise its estimate since the difference between the lowest 
bid and the FHA estimate was small, and they eventually allowed the project to move 
forward. In another instance, the different between the FHA estimate and the lowest bid 
was so large that the FHA was unwilling to make substantial changes to its estimate, 
thereby forcing the Army to cancel the project. To solve these issues, Congress enacted 
the Housing Act of 1956, which increased the mortgage amount from $13,500 to 
$16,500. After its passage, all bids were below the FHA estimate (Baldwin 1996). 
b. High Vacancy Rate at Wherry Housing Leads to DoD 
Acquisition of Wherry Housing Units 
During the hearings leading up to the Capehart legislation, Wherry 
housing sponsors began to voice concerns about the ability of their housing projects to 
compete with the newer and larger Capehart housing (Peeler et al. 2007, chap. 4, 91). 
Baldwin (1996) describes that service members preferred the larger and newer Capehart 
housing and that installation commanders also preferred Capehart housing since they had 
authority over the projects once they were turned over to the government when 
construction was completed. 
Wherry sponsors expressed that a vacancy rate higher than 5 percent 
would be unprofitable and that vacancy rates would increase as more Capehart housing 
came online. Eventually, 17 percent of all Wherry projects had vacancy rates of more 
than 5 percent by 1956 (Baldwin 1996). 
Higher vacancies were further exacerbated by taxes levied by local 
governments. Wherry sponsors experienced this setback in 1956 when the Supreme Court 
ruled that local governments could legally tax Wherry projects. With this increase in cost, 
owners of Wherry properties applied to the FHA for authority to increase rental rates in 
compensation of the increased tax burden.2  Unfortunately for Wherry sponsors, these 
local taxes and the subsequent increase in rental rates were not enough to make Wherry 
housing more attractive, thereby further increasing vacancy rates (Baldwin 1996). 
                                                 
2 Rental schedules had not originally accounted for any allowance for local taxes (Baldwin 1998). 
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In order to ease the problems with high vacancies in Wherry housing, the 
Housing Act of 1955 was passed to allow the Secretary of Defense to acquire Wherry 
units from the private sponsors at a fee equal to an FHA calculated replacement cost (less 
depreciation) formula which happened to be less than the fair market value of the units. 
Once additional legislation was passed in 1957 to provide sponsors with more favorable 
compensations, the DoD immediately began to acquire Wherry units, and by 1959 had 
acquired 70 percent of all Wherry units. The newly acquired Wherry housing units were 
eventually improved to Capehart specifications, which were generally larger and had 
more amenities (Baldwin 1996). 
The Wherry and Capehart housing programs helped the armed forces 
quickly meet their family housing demand despite some short comings. Though Wherry 
sponsors became disappointed as the program progressed, they had been able to make a 
profit on the construction which in some cases exceeded Congressional expectations. 
Also, the mortgage insurance premiums collected by the FHA were able to cover the 
default of 23 projects, which was an improvement over the performance of the Section 
608 program where defaults were more than three times as large (Baldwin 1996). The 
end results of both Wherry and Capehart programs are provided in Table 1. 
 
Navy Air Force Army Total
Wherry 
Units 24,366 36,812 22,249 83,427
Capehart 
Units 19,806 59,142 36,351 115,299  
Table 1.   Wherry and Capehart Housing Inventory, 1960 (After Peeler et al. 2007, 
chap. 4, 94) 
E. YEARS AFTER THE WHERRY AND CAPEHART PROGRAMS 
Even though there were efforts to privatize military family housing in the post-
war period with the Wherry and Capehart programs, the armed services supplemented 
privatization efforts with the construction of family housing using appropriated funds. 
Military construction funds were used in high cost and isolated areas, such as in Alaska, 
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where the Wherry and Capehart programs could not be implemented (Peeler et al. 2007, 
chap. 5, 105). Baldwin (1996) reports that during the 1960s and 1970s military family 
housing privatization programs fell out of political favor with Congress, and the DoD 
returned to building housing solely with appropriated funds. During the Vietnam War, 
expanding the military’s family housing stock was a low priority within the DoD. The 
budget priorities of the Carter Administration did not support increasing the level of 
housing construction, even though the proportion of married enlisted members had been 
on the rise since the end of World War II (Baldwin 1996). 
Nearly three decades after the Wherry plan of the 1950s, military housing needed 
to be revitalized, and in 1983, the Reagan Administration looked to the private sector to 
improve the military housing supply (Baldwin 1996). 
F. SECTION 801 AND 802 HOUSING PROGRAMS 
The Military Construction Authorization Act was signed by President Reagan in 
October of 1983 and contained two sections pertaining to military housing: 1) Section 
801, which established the Military Family Housing Program and 2) Section 802, which 
established the Military Housing Rental Guarantee Program. These programs were 
initially established as pilot programs which would require renewal every two years. 
Congress eventually passed legislation to make these programs permanent in 1991, even 
though the DoD had phased out use of these programs in the 1990s (Baldwin 1996). 









Section 801 Section 802 
 Projects constructed on private or 
public lands. 
 
 Units are rent free to service 




 Government lease may not exceed 
20 years after completion of 
construction. 
 
 Housing built to military 
specifications. 
 Projects constructed on private or 
public lands. 
 
 Service members pay rent using 
BAQ. Rental rates cannot be more 
than comparable rental units in the 
same area. 
 
 Rental guarantee is limited to a 15-
year maximum (25 years after 
FY87) and is not renewable. 
 
 Housing built to military 
specifications or local codes as 
approved by the service secretary. 
Table 2.   Summary of Section 801 and 802 Programs (After Baldwin 1996; 10 U.S.C. 
§2836) 
1. Section 801 Program: Build-to-Lease Guarantee 
The purpose of the Section 801 program was to increase the military housing 
supply by encouraging private developers to build new properties for lease to the 
government. This program allowed developers to bid and enter contract to build new 
housing either on DoD installations or nearby on private property. Once these projects 
were completed, the program allowed the DoD to lease this housing from the private 
developer for a period of twenty years (GAO 1986, 7). 
For housing constructed on an installation, there were two phases written into 
these contracts called “in-lease” and “out-lease” periods. During the in-lease phase, the 
DoD would lease the housing from the developer at a fixed rental rate (or at a variable 
rate based on the Consumer Price Index) regardless of occupancy level. After a 
predetermined period of time, the in-lease phase expired, and the rental burden shifted to 
the developer. During out-lease phase, the developer would pay the DoD to rent the land 
on the installation and have the option to rent units to the general public to meet gaps in 
occupancy. Once the lease was over, the program required the developer to turn over the 
land back to the DoD in its original condition (Inspector General 2008, 2). 
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2. Section 801 Obstacles 
As with the Capehart and Wherry housing programs thirty years before, the DoD 
faced hurdles in continually proving the merits of the program to Congress and providing 
incentives for developers to participate in the program (Baldwin 1996). 
a. Comparative Cost 
The act authorizing the Section 801 and 802 programs required that the 
DoD demonstrate to Congress that a leasing project was more economical than other 
methods providing the same housing. The DoD used the cost for building housing with 
appropriated funds as the ceiling cost for the leasing project (Baldwin 1996).   
In a 1986 study, the General Accounting Office (GAO) expressed 
reservations about the DoD’s implementation of the analysis of alternatives requirement. 
The GAO reported that the DoD did not use an adequate basis for determining cost-
effectiveness in comparing contracts based on a cost versus quality ratio. Using the cost-
quality comparison basis encouraged bidders to offer the highest quality within the cost 
ceiling, which the GAO investigated and reported to be within 95 and 100 percent of the 
maximum allowable cost. As a result, the government would have no assurance that 
housing is obtained for the lowest cost (GAO 1986, 11). Additionally, members of 
Congress did not believe that leasing was cheaper and insisted that the DoD show at least 
a 5 percent saving when compared to using appropriated funds to build housing (Baldwin 
1996). 
With the pressure of confronting a military housing deficit, Congressional 
appropriation committees demanded the DoD develop a five-year plan to meet the 
housing demand and extended the Section 801 program for two years. In 1987 as leasing 
costs were driven down, the DoD produced a plan that required 60 percent of new 
housing be built with appropriated funds and 40 percent leased with the Section 801 plan. 
Congressional leaders were still concerned that Section 801 housing was overpriced and 
that after 20 years of lease payments, the government had nothing to show for these 
outlays (Baldwin 1996). 
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b. Installment-Purchase Not a Viable Option 
Starting in 1988, members of Congress requested the DoD to submit 
proposed legislation for an installment-purchase program similar to the Capehart 
program. Members of Congress preferred an installment-purchase program over a leasing 
program because the government would own the housing once it was paid off (Baldwin 
1996). An installment-purchase program, such as the Capehart program of the 1950s 
(where government took ownership of the housing and mortgage once construction was 
completed), would give the government more control over the project and would provide 
the government a real estate asset at the end of the term (Twiss and Martin 1998, 53).   
DoD officials argued that an installment-purchase program was not a 
viable option due to budget scoring rules (Twiss and Martin 1998, 53). Installment-
purchase programs had not been used since the 1950s when Congress implemented a full 
funding policy for DoD procurement (O’Rourke and Daggett 2007, 1). This policy was 
designed to allow Congress the ability to exercise more oversight and to better 
understand total procurement cost in fulfilling its key financial oversight role. Full 
funding for procurement programs required that the DoD budget for the entire cost of the 
project in the year that it is procured (O’Rourke and Daggett 2007, 2). Even though 
installment-purchase programs, such as the Capehart program, were attractive 
alternatives, leasing allowed the DoD to budget one year’s worth of housing at a time 
vice budgeting for 20 years of costs in one year (Baldwin 1996).   
c. Budget Scoring Rules Change for Leases 
In 1990, Office of Budget and Management (OMB) changed how long-
term leases, like the Section 801, would be scored in annual budgets. Like scoring 
installment-purchases, budgets would now more accurately reflect the total obligated cost 
of a 20-year lease. Specifically, leases would be scored for the total legal obligation in the 
year that the lease is first incurred instead of being scored on an annual basis. These new 
rules typically made the total capital cost of a project, plus the financing premium, greater 
than an outright purchase of housing with appropriated funds. This change to scoring 
leases made the Section 801 housing projects so unattractive that the DoD effectively 
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abandoned the program (Defense Science Board 1995, 57–58). At the end of FY91, the 
DoD announced that no future request would be made for projects under the Section 801 
and 802 programs (Baldwin 1996). 
3. Section 802 Program, Rental Guarantee 
The DoD used the Section 802 program to encourage private developers to build 
rental units for direct lease to service members by guaranteeing an occupancy level of no 
less than 97 percent. Private developers were allowed to lease housing to civilians but 
were required to give priority consideration to service members (GAO 1986, 7). The 
terms of this guarantee were originally set to be 15 years and were then extended to 
25 years by Congress in 1986 to provide more incentive to private developers (Baldwin 
1996). 
The cost of the Section 802 program was centered on the service members’ ability 
to pay instead of the cost to build and maintain as with the Section 801 program (Baldwin 
1996). The rental rate the service member would pay the developer was the sum of the 
following: BAQ, plus Variable Housing Allowance, plus 15 percent out of pocket 
expense from the service member, less the estimated cost of utilities (Defense Science 
Board 1995, 62). 
Baldwin (1996) explains that this program was not successful because there was 
not enough incentive to offset the risk for developers to participate. The two issues that 
presented risks for developers were low ceiling costs and the fact that a major portion of 
the rent was frozen over the term of the contract (Baldwin 1996).   
First, to offset the low ceiling cost, the DoD worked with Congress to modify the 
program to entice developers by only building Section 802 on government land and 
providing utilities from the base to offset those costs, having developers renovate existing 
housing, and by lengthening the rental period from 15 to 25 years (Baldwin 1996). 
Second, given that a majority of the rent was frozen, developers would be 
exposed to the risk of inflation. The rent consisted of two portions: (1) shelter rent, which 
was fixed, and (2) an adjustable maintenance rate. Because of this exposure to inflation, 
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developers experienced difficulty in obtaining financing (GAO 1986, 19). Not until 1990 
did a service come forward to seek approval for a Section 802 housing project. The 
Army, which was in charge of all housing in Hawaii, announced the first Section 802 
project, 276 units, to be completed on the Kaneohe Bay Marine Corps Base (Baldwin 
1996). This project was the only Section 802 project completed (Defense Science Board 
1995, 62). 
G. CONCLUSION 
Baldwin (1996) recaps that the DoD had demonstrated that three privatization 
methods proved to be lasting and appropriate for providing military family housing under 
favorable conditions: 1) rental guarantees, 2) installment-purchases, and 3) leasing. 
Rental guarantees had some problems domestically in the Section 802 program, but 
proved to be beneficial in the Overseas Rental Guarantee program.3  Secondly, the 
installment-purchase method allowed developers to build housing with mortgages insured 
by the federal government, as in the Capehart plan, and then the service would take over 
the mortgage and amortize them with appropriated funds once construction was 
completed. Lastly, the leasing method did not provide much benefit over MilCon 
alternatives after changes to budget scoring made this program unfavorable (Baldwin 








Table 3.   Total Number of Units Constructed Under the Four Private Housing 
Programs (After Baldwin 1996; Defense Science Board 1995) 
                                                 
3 In the Overseas Rental Guarantee program, established in 1952, the DoD would work with private 
developers to provide housing.  The DoD would commit to certain levels of occupancy for a fixed period of 
time similar to the Section 802 program (Baldwin 1996). 
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III. MILITARY HOUSING PRIVATIZATION INITIATIVE 
We must demonstrate to our men and women in service that their quality-
of-life needs will be taken care of so that they can dedicate their full 
attention to the mission. When military members worry unduly about 
personal finances and whether their families are properly cared for, 
morale and efficiency decline with corresponding effects on retention and 
readiness. 
—Major General R. Dean Tice 
A. MHPI BACKGROUND 
In 1998, the DoD reported to Congress that approximately 200,000 of existing 
military family housing units needed to be renovated or replaced due to age or inadequate 
maintenance. The DoD proposed that the private sector’s investment capital and expertise 
were needed to provide new, higher quality housing in the quickest and most efficient 
manner over a ten-year period (GAO 1998, 3). 
At the DoD’s request, Congress enacted the Military Housing Privatization 
Initiative (MHPI) as part of the FY96 National Defense Authorization Act, creating new 
authorities in 10 U.S.C. for privatization for military housing (GAO 1998, 2). The MHPI, 
initially authorized for five years as a pilot program, was made permanent in 2004 (DoD 
2006a, 4). The new provisions in 10 U.S.C. granted DoD the authority to 1) provide 
direct loans and loan guarantees to private entities, 2) lease existing property and 
facilities to private entities, and 3) allow developers to design and build military housing 
comparable to housing in the local communities (GAO 1998, 2–3). Unlike privatization 
programs discussed in the previous chapter, the MHPI gave the DoD flexibility to act like 
a private enterprise by taking advantage of local market conditions and by tailoring the 
financial resources for each development project (Else 2001, 4). 
B. THE MHPI PROCESS OVERVIEW 
As outlined in the DoD Housing Management Manual (2010a), the process of 
using privatization to build new housing is a multi-step process. Figure 2 depicts an 
overview of how the procurement process flows for a typical project. 
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Figure 2.   The MHPI Process (From DoD 2006a, 9) 
1. MHPI Procedures 
Governing procedures for the MHPI process are outlined in 10 U.S.C. and in the 
DoD Housing Management Manual (4164.63-M). The Office of the Secretary of Defense 
provides overall oversight and serves as an approval authority for each of the milestones. 
The service departments are responsible for procurement procedures and execution of the 
project. Congressional notification is required before solicitation is issued to the public 
and prior to awarding the project (Else 2001, 8) 
a. Concept Approval 
The first step in the process is concept approval, also known as the 
feasibility assessment. A feasibility study is conducted by the service to determine 
whether the required housing will be newly constructed or renovated from existing 
properties. The service departments examine project concepts and conduct cost-benefit 
analysis between MHPI authorities and traditional MilCon alternatives (Else 2001, 8). 
The services are responsible for covering any cost for project development and consultant 
expenses during this phase. The services then present concept briefs to the Deputy Under 
Secretary of Defense (Installations & Environment) (DUSD(I&E)). These briefs 
demonstrate validation of the requirements, provide financial justification, and address 
any issues specific to the project (DoD 2010a, 34). 
b. Solicitation Development 
Once the DUSD(I&E) approves the project concept, the service secretary 
is authorized to notify Congress of the service’s intention to solicit proposals for the 
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project (DoD 2010a, 34). This notification to Congress is required by §2884 of 10 U.S.C. 
Proposals are then reviewed and approved by the DUSD(I&E), and a solicitation notice is 
issued to the construction industry (Else 2001, 6). After a thirty-day wait period (sixty 
days for limited loan guarantees), the service issues requests for proposals and 
commences the acquisitions process (DoD 2010a, 34). 
c. Proposal Evaluation and Project Award 
After all proposals are reviewed, the service presents, an economic 
analysis, a scoring report, and other project documentation to the DUSD(I&E) for source 
selection approval. The DUSD(I&E) then submits the scoring report to the Office of 
Management and Budget (OMB) for approval (DoD 2010a, 34). Congressional 
notification is required before the service awards the contract in accordance with §2884 
of 10 U.S.C. 
d. Oversight and Monitoring 
The final step is for the applicable service to execute and monitor the 
project and provide DUSD(I&E) with semi-annual status reports on project completion 
and financial health (DoD 2010a, 35). Additionally, the Secretary of Defense is required 
to provide an annual report detailing the fiscal expenditure and receipts from DoD 
housing accounts,4 status of activities and acquisitions for each of the services, and other 
items of interest to the appropriate Congressional committees (10 U.S.C., §2883-§2884). 
2. MHPI Alternative Authorizations 
The MHPI alternative authorizations outlined in 10 U.S.C. allow the services to 
scale a project’s impact on the budget through various levels of budget scoring. For 
example, transferring ownership of government assets (e.g., land or housing units) to a 
developer is scored at zero percent which leads to no impact on the budget. On the other 
end of the spectrum, use of the build-to-lease authority has a high impact on the budget 
since the net present value (NPV) of all lease payments would be scored in the first year 
                                                 
4 These accounts were established to hold appropriated funds, money received from conveyance of 
government property, and other income derived from the MHPI financial authorities (10 U.S.C. §2883). 
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at 100 percent. Overall, the DoD aimed to minimize outlays in the near term by soliciting 
the private sector to invest at a rate of at least $3 for each dollar the government invested 
in new construction and renovations (GAO 1998, 3). Table 4 describes and ranks the 
alternative authorities from lowest to highest impact on the budget. 
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Table 4.   Alternative Authorizations Ranked by Impact on Budget (After Else 2001) 
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C. MHPI OBSTACLES 
1. Early Delays in Implementing MHPI 
The promise to provide housing quicker and cheaper was met with challenges at 
the start of the program. Within the first two years, only one project at Lackland Air 
Force Base for 420 new units was close to contract signing (GAO 1998, 22–23). This 
delay was due to legal, financial, contractual, and budgetary issues in executing the new 
program. Legal issues had to be addressed in areas of property and acquisition, and new 
protocols and procedures had to be developed for contracting. Furthermore, the DoD and 
the OMB had to compromise on how each of the various alternative authorities would be 
scored. A written agreement was eventually developed for the first twenty projects, 
pending a review of the agreement for follow-on projects (GAO 1998, 22–23). Because 
of these delays, the DoD extended the original timeline for meeting its ten-year housing 
goal by four more years to FY10 (GAO 1998, 4). 
As evidenced by several GAO reports (i.e., 1998, 2000, 2001, 2002, 2004, and 
2006) to Congress and the DoD, members of Congress were concerned about the DoD 
requirements determination process, cost analysis, and overall lack of a department-wide 
long-term strategy.  
2. Requirements Determination Process 
First, some legislators were concerned that the government might be procuring 
more housing than was required. They were skeptical that the DoD had sufficient 
assurance that budget submissions correctly addressed actual family housing needs. The 
GAO (1996, 5) found that the services underestimated the private sector’s ability to meet 
military family housing needs and that the methodologies of the services resulted in a 
self-perpetuating requirement for government housing. In 1997, a review by the DoD’s 
Inspector General revealed that the DoD needed to develop standard processes and 
procedures for determining family housing requirements (GAO 1998, 33). Overall, the 
DoD’s requirements development process was complicated by using inconsistent 
methods, increasing housing allowances, and having different housing standards between 
housing on-base and in the community (GAO 2002).   
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a.  Inconsistent Requirements Determination Processes 
Contrary to DoD policy, the requirements determination process did not 
primarily rely on private sector housing first. The DoD’s policy to primarily rely on 
private sector housing was established to be the most economical form of privatization 
with an average annual government savings of $4,957 FY95$ per household. These 
savings were gained from the service member bearing more out-of-pocket housing 
expenses, less contributions for education economic impact aid,5 and no construction, 
operations, and maintenance costs (GAO 1998, 32–33). Reliance on private sector 
housing first also provided the services with short-term flexibility by avoiding long-term 
commitments with MilCon dollars and by avoiding contractual obligations to develop 
new housing with a risk of military base closures (GAO 1998, 34). 
The analysis for required housing often overestimated the housing needed 
because the department’s methods did not properly account for private sector housing 
(GAO 2002, 8). For example, the services’ market analysis sometimes matched the 
housing need to existing government units rather than first assessing the community’s 
ability to meet the requirements first and then determining additional government 
housing required to cover the difference. The GAO assessed that this method could 
possibly lead to the DoD improperly investing dollars to maintain and renovate existing 
government units which could be retired once they fulfilled their useful life (GAO 2002, 
8). In another example, some services required a minimum number of government units 
even if the community could meet the housing demand or underestimated the number of 
available vacant units in the community, thereby inflating the number of required units 
(GAO 2002, 8). 
b. Increases in Housing Allowances 
Second, the GAO (2002) assessed that a separate initiative to increase 
BAH and reduce military members’ housing out-of-pocket cost to zero by 2005 had a 
significant impact on the MHPI requirements determination. As BAH increases, so would 
                                                 
5 This aid was compensation paid to local governments for educating military dependents since the 
government did not pay local taxes for government-owned housing (GAO 1996). 
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the amount of available housing increase for a given allowance rate, thereby reducing 
number of government units required for an installation. Also, private investors may see a 
business opportunity to independently develop housing near military installations to 
profit from the increased rates.   
Altogether, when military members are given a choice between civilian 
housing and housing on an installation, all costs being equal, studies (e.g., 1999 DoD 
Survey of Active Duty Personnel and 1999 RAND survey) have shown that members 
prefer to live in civilian housing (GAO 2002, 9–10). With the increase in BAH rates, the 
GAO assessed that less housing would be required across the DoD, and the DoD should 
factor this reduction into their requirements determination process. 
c. Differences In Housing Standards 
Lastly, different housing standards for family size inflated the need for 
military housing. When determining military housing requirements, the DoD used family 
size as a factor for housing size. This entitled larger military families to houses larger 
than they may be able to afford in the private community. Comparisons between vacant 
housing available in the community and military housing required were difficult because 
housing allowances were the same independent of family size (GAO 2002, 10–11). 
Service members would have an incentive to reduce out-of-pocket cost by 
choosing to live on base where they are entitled to a larger home than they could afford in 
the local community. This disparity in standards for family size increased the demand for 
government housing and lowered reliance on the community for housing which was also 
contrary to DoD’s policy of using housing surrounding the installation first (GAO 2002, 
10–11). 
3. An Integrated Long-Term Strategy 
According to analysis conducted by the GAO in 2000, the DoD had not developed 
an overall housing strategy that integrated all resources to address the housing need. A 
congressional committee directed the DoD to better coordinate the use of  housing 
options, such as housing allowances and military construction, through an integrated 
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strategy as the department moved forward with the privatization initiative (GAO 2000, 7–
8). As of 2000, the DoD made some progress in coordinating housing initiatives through 
the Installations Policy Board, which reviewed and coordinated among various DoD 
offices on matters of housing, allowances, and member quality of life issues, but did not 
yet formalize the integrated housing strategy (GAO 2000, 42).   
The interdependency between privatization efforts and increasing military 
housing allowance rates highlights the challenges in coordinating programs across the 
DoD. An increase in BAH rates may cause demand for on-base housing to go down since 
military families have shown that they would prefer civilian housing more over on-base 
housing as BAH rates increase (Buddin et al. 1999, 94). For military privatized housing, 
an increase in allowance rates would result in a corresponding increase in rental rates to 
the developer, which could then result in large, unexpected profits. On the other hand, 
lowering of allowance rates may result in the developer cutting corners on operations and 
maintenance (GAO 2000, 71). 
4. Life-Cycle Cost Analysis 
In the early years of the MHPI, the DoD was slow in developing consistent 
methods for determining the project life-cycle cost across all the services. Though cost 
analysis already had been completed and privatization projects awarded, members of 
Congress questioned whether the DoD could consistently determine which projects to 
approve in the government’s best interest. 
The services compared cost of privatization against the cost of military 
construction to decide whether a proposed privatization project should be approved for 
solicitation. In a 2000 GAO report, the GAO found that after reviewing the life-cycle cost 
analysis for twelve projects, there were inconsistencies, inaccuracies, or lack of support 
for some assumptions and estimates (GAO 2000, 34): 
 Seven analyses did not consider costs for project planning and design; 
 Three analyses did not consider the value of government property conveyed to the 
developers; 
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 Two analyses included the value of conveyed property but did not provide 
supporting documentation for the estimates used; 
 Six analyses did not include costs for monitoring the privatization contract; 
 Two analyses did not use the correct Office of Management and Budget discount 
rate to adjust for the time value of money; 
 No analyses were performed for two projects. 
The GAO proved that the cost analysis prepared by the services showed modest 
savings from utilizing privatization over military construction. In the housing projects 
surveyed in the 2000 study, the service’s cost analysis estimated that the government 
would save approximately 12 percent by using privatization instead of military 
construction. After correcting for cost estimation discrepancies, the GAO estimated that 
privatization should cost the government about 11 percent less than military construction 
for the projects assessed (GAO 2000, 36). The DoD agreed that improvements were 
needed in cost estimation and had previously issued draft guidance in response to a 1998 
GAO report, but the DoD still had yet to finalize the report in 2000 (GAO 2000, 63). 
The GAO also cautioned that with the modest savings gained by privatization, 
further increases in housing allowances could make privatization more costly than 
housing built with military construction funds. The DoD did not agree with this 
assessment. In response to this report, the Deputy Under Secretary (Installations) stated 
that an increase in allowances would reduce life-cycle costs since projects would be more 
“financially viable” and reduce the need for upfront government financial contributions 
(GAO 2000, 64). The DoD planned to include financial mechanisms6 to ensure that life-
cycle cost did not increase with an increase in allowances (GAO 2000, 64). 
Overall, the GAO assessed that privatization had a relatively low effect on the 
total cost to the government and merely shifted cost from military construction and 
operations and maintenance accounts to military personnel accounts in the form of 
housing allowances (GAO 2000, 37).  
                                                 
6 For example, reinvestment accounts, revenue sharing accounts and increased rents where government 
property is leased (GAO 2000, 64). 
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By 2002, the DoD had updated life-cycle cost estimation policies, but the GAO 
identified areas to further improve to prevent privatization from appearing more 
favorable than justified. The GAO reported that life-cycle cost estimates would be more 
reliable by including the cost incurred to oversee project contracts and by using 
conventional apartment operations and maintenance data instead of federally assisted 
apartment data (GAO 2002, 15). After recalculating life-cycle cost including the 
additional adjustments described above for the first ten projects, the GAO determined 
three of the ten projects would cost more than the military construction option. Though 
more costly than the military construction option, DoD officials stated that the anticipated 
cost to the government would be less in the short term than the military construction 
option due to budget scoring (GAO 2002, 16–17). 
As of the date of June 2012, the DoD has formally implemented most of the 
GAO’s recommendations. The DoD currently mandates the considerations listed in 
Figure 3 in determining the life-cycle cost to the government. 
 
 
Figure 3.   DoD Housing Management Manual Policy for Determining Life-Cycle Cost 
for the Privatization Option (After DoD 2010a). 
Expected costs to the Government: 
 
(1) Consultant Support (Through the Project Term).  Based on planned and actual costs. 
  
(2) Construction Inspection.  Based on planned or actual inspection costs.  
 
(3) BAH.  Based on anticipated BAH for members living in privatized housing units.  
 
(4) Credit Scored Amount.  Based on modeled or final scored amount.  
 
(5) School Impact Aid. Based on actual expected costs under privatization. 
 
(6) Housing Management Personnel. Based on expected costs under privatization.  
 
(7) Portfolio Management. Based on expected costs under privatization.  
 
(8) Relocation (Drayage). Based on expected costs (if authorized). 
 
Expected returns to the Government: 
 
(1) Rents or proceeds from the conveyance of property based on modeled or negotiated costs, including any 
Government returns from increases in housing allowances.  
 
(2) Expected return on investments in nongovernmental entities based on modeled or negotiated costs, 
including Government returns from increases in housing allowances. 
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D. CONCLUSION 
The services currently rely on privatization to help meet their housing needs. The 
MHPI has been effective at leveraging private investment to remedy the housing deficit 
over the past fifteen years. As Dr. Dorothy Robyn, DUSD(I&E), recently reported to 
Congress (2012), “the Services have generated $29.7 billion in construction to build new 
and renovate existing family housing units” with a government investment of only 
$3.6 billion (Figure 4).   
 
 
Figure 4.   Total Project Financial Contributions (From DoD 2012) 
The DoD has nearly achieved its goal of eliminating the approximately 200,000 
inadequate homes over the course of fifteen years (Figures 5 and 6). Figure 6 also shows 
the number of units added to the total housing inventory to reduce the housing deficit 










Figure 6.   Total Privatized Units Since MHPI Inception (From DoD 2012) 
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IV. LESSONS APPLIED TO MHPI 
Readiness is associated most closely with the morale and esprit de corps 
of U.S. Soldiers, Sailors, Airmen, and Marines. These intangibles are 
maintained by ensuring the best possible quality of life for people in 
uniform and their families. Quality of life falls into three general 
categories: standard of living for servicemembers; demands made on 
personnel, especially time away from family; and other ways people are 
treated while in the service. 
—William J. Perry, Secretary of Defense 
Based on the data presented in the previous chapters, the major lesson learned 
from the early housing privatization programs was that the DoD needed the flexibility to 
manage all the risks associated with private ventures. The DoD Risk Management Guide 
for DoD Acquisition (2006b, 1) defines risk as “a measure of future uncertainties in 
achieving program performance goals and objectives within defined cost, schedule and 
performance constraints.” 
A. IMPORTANCE TO THE ALTERNATIVE AUTHORITIES 
The MHPI has been successful because the service departments have had the 
proper tools (in the alternative authorizations) to manage risks unlike the four early 
privatization programs discussed in Chapter II. The one-size-fits-all approach used in the 
early privation programs introduced construction inefficiencies with federal housing 
standards preventing the use of local building practices, stymied continuous improvement 
due to fixed ceiling costs in the Wherry and Capehart programs, and prevented the 
adjustment of the fixed portions of Section 802 rents (Peeler et al. 2007, chap. 6, 112–
122; Baldwin 1996). Additionally, applying stringent requirements on developers 
provided too little incentive for them to continue participation (Baldwin 1996). For 
example, the Wherry program failed when sponsors lost interest in the program after 
tougher cost certification rules went into effect. Early privatization programs were not 
long-lasting because the DoD was not able to tailor levels of budget scoring or to 
cultivate the environment necessary to motivate developers for the life of the project 
(Else 2001, 3–4).  
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Because each project brings its own set of risks to the table, the services require 
flexibility to customize each venture by minimizing exposure to risks for both parties and 
maximizing positive sum outcomes. To make privatization work, the government uses 
the alternative authorizations to mitigate unfavorable outcomes for both the developers 
the government. Based on the data presented in previous chapters, Figure 7 depicts how 













































































































































Figure 7. Relationships Between Risks and Alternate Authorities (continued)
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B. RECOMMENDATION 
As a majority of privatization projects are completed and have been transitioned 
to the operations phase, the recommendation is to have a comprehensive review of all 
risks associated with the MHPI placing emphasis on sustainment of performance and 
continued customer satisfaction. 
C. CONCLUSION 
By having the necessary tools for managing stakeholders’ risks, the services have 
the flexibility required to make privatization work given the increased uncertainty and 
complexity introduced when compared to using appropriated funds. Privatization of 
military housing has been successful in delivering the quality and quantity of housing 
required to ensure that service members quality of life enables them to focus on their 
mission. The ability for the government to provide adequate housing to service members 
and their families is directly tied to combat readiness (Defense Science Board 1995, 3–4). 
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APPENDIX.  AUTHORITIES IN THE MILITARY HOUSING 
PRIVATIZATION INITIATIVE 
The following list describes the authorities of the MHPI as summarized in the 
GAO report of 1998. 
 Direct loans: The DoD may make direct loans to persons in the private sector to 
provide funds for the acquisition or construction of housing units suitable for use 
as military family or unaccompanied housing. (10 U.S.C. 2873(a),(1)) 
 Loan guarantees: DoD may guarantee a loan to any person in the private sector if 
the proceeds of the loan are used to acquire or construct housing units suitable for 
use as military family or unaccompanied housing. (10 U.S.C. 2873(b)) 
 Build and lease: DoD may enter into contracts for the lease of military family or 
unaccompanied housing units to be constructed under the initiative. (10 U.S.C. 
2874) 
 Investments in nongovernmental entities: DoD may make investments in 
nongovernmental entities carrying out projects for the acquisition or construction 
of housing units suitable for use as military family or unaccompanied housing. An 
investment under this section may include a limited partnership interest, a 
purchase of stock or other equity instruments, a purchase of bonds or other debt 
instruments, or any combination of such forms of investment. (10 U.S.C. 
2875(a),(b)) 
 Rental guarantees: DoD may enter into agreements with private persons that 
acquire or construct military family or unaccompanied housing units under the 
initiative to guarantee specified occupancy levels or to guarantee specific rental 
income levels. (10 U.S.C. 2876) 
 Differential lease payments: Pursuant to an agreement to lease military family or 
unaccompanied housing to service members, DoD may pay the lessor an amount 
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in addition to the rental payments made by military occupants to encourage the 
lessor to make the housing available to military members. (10 U.S.C. 2877) 
 Conveyance or lease of existing property and facilities: DoD may convey or lease 
property or facilities, including ancillary supporting facilities, to private persons 
for purposes of using the proceeds to carry out activities under the initiative. (10 
U.S.C. 2878) 
 Interim leases: Pending completion of a project under the initiative, DoD may 
provide for the interim lease of completed units. The term of the lease may not 
extend beyond the project’s completion date. (10 U.S.C. 2879) 
 Conformity with similar local housing units: DoD will ensure that the room 
patterns and floor areas of military family and unaccompanied housing units 
acquired or constructed under the initiative are generally comparable to the room 
patterns and floor areas of similar housing units in the locality concerned. Space 
limitations by paygrade on military family housing units provided in other 
legislation will not apply to housing acquired under the initiative. (10 U.S.C. 
2880(a),(b)) 
 Ancillary supporting facilities: Any project for the acquisition or construction of 
military family or unaccompanied housing units under the initiative may include 
the acquisition or construction of ancillary supporting facilities for the housing. 
(10 U.S.C. 2881) 
 Assignment of members of the armed forces to housing units: DoD may assign 
service members to housing units acquired or constructed under the initiative. (10 
U.S.C. 2882) 
 Lease payments through pay allotments: DoD may require service members who 
lease housing acquired or constructed under the initiative to make lease payments 
by allotment from their pay. (10 U.S.C. 2882(c)) 
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